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Abstract 
Foreign direct investment flows into Vietnam have increased significantly in recent years and 
are distributed unequally between provinces. This article aims to investigate the locational 
determinants of foreign direct investment in 62 Vietnamese provinces and whether spatial 
dependence is a significant factor that both researchers and policy-makers should take into 
account. We report that province-specific per-capita income, secondary education enrolment, 
labor costs, openness to trade, and domestic investment affect foreign direct investment directly 
within the province itself and have indirect effects on foreign direct investment in neighboring 
provinces. The direct and indirect effects coexist with spill-over effects and spatial dependence 
between provinces. Our findings indicate that foreign direct investment in Vietnam reflects a 
combination of complex vertical and export platform motivations on the part of foreign 
investors; and an agglomeration dynamic that may perpetuate the existing regional disparities 
in the distribution of foreign direct investment capital between provinces. 
Key words: Foreign direct investment, spatial dependence, agglomeration, Vietnam. 
JEL classification numbers:  C31, F23, R12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Accepted for publication in The Singapore Economic Review. DOI: 10.1142/S0217590815501155  
2 
 
 
 
 
A Spatial Regression Approach to FDI in Vietnam: 
Province-level Evidence  
 
1. Introduction 
Locational determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been investigated extensively, 
but empirical work on determinants of FDI in sub-national units is limited to few studies that 
concentrate mainly on China. In addition, most of the empirical work overlooks spatial 
interdependence between host markets - even though foreign investors’ location decisions 
involve a choice between competing host units that are related to each other through physical 
distance among other factors. This is particularly the case when one investigates the distribution 
of FDI between sub-national units that are subject to a common set of macroeconomic and trade 
policies. Therefore, investigating the patterns of interdependence and whether the latter is 
conducive to agglomeration or competition effects are important for correct inference and 
evidence-based policy and practice.  
As Blonigen et al. (2007) indicate, spatial econometrics provides useful techniques that 
investigate spatial interdependence between countries or sub-national regions. In this article, 
we use a spatial lag model that allows for: (i) estimating the degree of spatial dependence 
between FDI capital registered in Vietnamese provinces; and (ii) distinguishing between the 
direct, indirect and feedback effects that province-specific factors such as per-capita GDP, labor 
cost, openness to trade and education, governance quality, etc. have on FDI within the province 
itself and its neighbors.  
Application of spatial regression analysis to FDI in Vietnamese provinces can enhance the 
evidence base and provide better support for evidence-based policy for several reasons. First, 
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during the period under investigation (2006-2009), Vietnamese provinces have attracted high 
levels of FDI flows that have enabled Vietnam to register the second-highest FDI/GDP ratio 
after Singapore. Furthermore, provincial authorities in Vietnam have been competing to attract 
foreign investors, using fiscal incentives and disseminating province-level data on governance 
quality, education, labor training facilities, infrastructure, etc. These developments raise policy-
related questions as to whether FDI in Vietnamese provinces have been subject to competition 
or agglomeration dynamics and with what implications for regional convergence/divergence.  
 
Spatial dependence analysis is also called for because it allows for addressing 
theoretical/empirical questions concerning the type of foreign investors (i.e., whether the latter 
consist of horizontal, vertical or complex vertical multinational enterprises) and the extent to 
which FDI is geared to supply the domestic or export markets. Finally, spatial regression is also 
necessary to address inference problems that arise when spatial dependence exists in the data 
generating process. In the presence of spatial dependence, ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
estimates are biased because the assumption of cross-sectional independence is violated and the 
exclusion of the spatial dependence causes model misspecification bias.  
 
To address these issues, we begin with a review of the relevant literature in section 2, where we 
draw attention to the relative absence of spatial analysis in empirical studies on the Pacific 
region in general and Vietnam in particular. This is followed by contextual information on FDI 
in Vietnam in section 3, which summarizes the distribution of FDI between provinces and the 
share of ‘foreign-invested sector’ in total export earnings over the last decade. Section 4 
describes the data and introduces the spatial regression methodology. In section 5, we present 
the empirical findings, which consist of a set of estimates for spatial dependence and direct and 
indirect effects, based on different specifications of the number of neighboring provinces and/or 
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the distance between provinces. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and distils some policy 
implications.  
 
2. Literature review 
Reliance on a two-country (or bilateral) framework that consists of one home and one host 
country is a potential weakness in the theoretical and empirical work on locational determinants 
of FDI (Blonigen et al. 2007). There are two reasons as to why this may be the case. First, FDI 
decisions by multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be motivated by horizontal, vertical or 
complex-vertical specialization motives that, in turn, induce MNEs to consider the 
characteristics of both host- and third-countries. Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) and 
Blonigen et al. (2007) provide a useful typology of MNEs’ specialization motives and how the 
latter can be ascertained from the sign of the spatial dependence between a host country/region 
and third countries. If MNEs are motivated by horizontal investment considerations aimed at 
circumventing trade restrictions or high transportation costs, spatial dependence should not be 
observed because horizontal FDI decisions depend on the difference between the benefits of 
investment location’s proximity to the destination market and the cost of installing a new plant 
in that location. In the case of pure vertical FDI, however, MNEs evaluate all potential 
destination countries/regions to find the lowest-cost provider of the operations it wishes to 
relocate. Therefore, vertical FDI in one location usually occurs at the expense of other locations 
in its neighborhood. This type of spatial interdependence is captured by a negative coefficient 
on the spatial dependence variable.  
 
However, pure horizontal or vertical motives are rarely the norm, with majority of the FDI 
flows reflecting complex vertical specialization considerations. In such cases, we expect a 
positive spatial dependence between host countries/regions and third countries/regions. This is 
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because complex vertical specialization involves segmentation of the production activities, each 
of which may be located in a separate geographic unit. In this case, FDI in one region may be 
correlated positively with investment in neighboring regions either because of existing suppliers 
in the latter or due to agglomeration effects that may be caused by ‘natural resources’ such as 
mines or infrastructure facilities such as ports (Blonigen et al. 2007).  
 
The earliest attempt at estimating the determinants of FDI by taking account of spatial 
interdependence is the study of Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995), which examines the role of 
agglomeration effects in determining the location of Japanese FDI in the US. They use a 
conditional-logit model and report that agglomeration effects between bordering states are 
significant. Head and Mayer (2004), on the other hand, examine the distribution of Japanese 
FDI in the European Union, taking account of distance-weighted or trade-frictions-weighted 
GDP in adjacent regions. They report that more developed regions attract higher levels of FDI 
and that this effect is robust to inclusion of agglomeration measures as in Head, Ries, and 
Swenson (1995). Although innovative, these studies utilize discrete choice models and as such 
they do not use the existing data on FDI levels efficiently (Blonigen et al. 2007,p.1305). 
 
In between, Coughlin and Segev (2000) use a spatial error model to estimate the determinants 
of US FDI across Chinese provinces. They conclude that a shock to FDI in one province has 
positive effects on FDI in nearby provinces. Furthermore, they report that market size, labour 
productivity, coastal location, wages, and illiteracy rates are statistically significant, while 
transportation cost is not a significant determinant of FDI across Chinese provinces. Coughlin 
and Segev (2000) represent the first departure from the discrete choice models developed by 
Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) and Head and Mayer (2004). It also motivated two seminal 
6 
 
contributions by Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007), both of 
whom examine the impact of spatial dependence on outbound US FDI. 
 
Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) develop a model of FDI activity that allows for a variety 
of MNE motivations and spatial interactions. They report significant evidence of spatial 
interactions, but they cannot conclude whether export-platform or complex vertical FDI 
motivation is the dominant one. On the other hand, Blonigen et al. (2007) find that spatial 
interdependence has a significant effect on the distribution of FDI between neighboring 
countries and that the estimated parameters for the traditional determinants of FDI (i.e., for the 
host-country characteristics) are robust to inclusion of spatial interdependence terms. 
Nevertheless, Blonigen et al. (2007) also report that the existence of spatial interactions does 
not necessarily allow for robust conclusions about export-platform or complex-vertical 
motivations for FDI. This is because the estimated spatial interdependence may be sensitive to 
sample selection.  
 
Mainly due to data constraints, the volume of work on sub-national distribution of FDI in 
developing countries is small and the number of studies utilizing spatial analysis is even 
smaller. For example Na and Lightfoot (2006), and Du, Lu, and Tao (2008), Cole, Elliott, and 
Zhang (2009) investigate the locational determinants of FDI across Chinese provinces; but 
without taking account of spatial dependence between regions. Using a panel of 30 provinces 
and 6 years from 1998-2003, Cole, Elliott, and Zhang (2009) report that provincial GDP per 
capita, government efficiency, anti-corruption effort, good road transportation networks, and 
surplus of unskilled labor are significant determinants of FDI across provinces. On the other 
hand, Na and Lightfoot (2006) use cross-section data for 30 regions in 2002 and conclude that 
market size, labor quality, labor costs, and the level of infrastructure are important determinants 
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of FDI. Du, Lu, and Tao (2008) confirm the significance of economic institutions, wages and 
infrastructure; while they further add special economic zones, coastal cities to their analysis of 
locational determinants of US multinationals in China. Finally, Karim and Fleming (2012) find 
that FDI inflows in manufacturing sector across 13 states and 1 federal territory in Malaysia are 
responsive to market demand, labor productivity, and socio-economic development. 
 
In the case of Vietnam, Pham (2002) uses averaged data over the period 1988-1998 and 
provides OLS estimates of the FDI determinants in 53 provinces. The author finds that per-
capita income, labor quality and phone lines per capita are related to FDI flows. Another 
empirical work is Malesky (2007), who uses cross-section data with different measures of FDI, 
including new FDI projects licensed, implemented FDI as a proportion of registered FDI, and 
additional capital for existing projects. The findings indicate that FDI is not related to GDP per 
capita, labor quality, and tax incentives; but different measures of FDI are found to be related 
positively to different measures of institutional/governance quality. Using the provincial 
competiveness index (PCI) and its constituent components, Malesky (2007) reports that the 
investment attraction capacity of the provinces is positively related to the transparency of 
regulatory information and private sector development services they provide. However, the 
level of implemented FDI is mostly influenced by the security of property rights.  
 
Using a panel data for 60 provinces over the period 2000-2005, Vu, Le, and Vo (2007) 
investigate the relationship between FDI and tax incentives offered by provincial governments 
independently of the national government. The effect of tax incentives on FDI is rejected by 
their study but investment climate measured by PCI, infrastructure, proximity to major markets, 
and education are found statistically significant. Furthermore, while per-capita GDP is found to 
have no effect on implemented FDI, the effect of wage level is reported as positive. Finally, 
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Nguyen (2006) and Pham (2008) report that per-capita income, education, domestic investment, 
exports, skills, and labor cost are related to province-level FDI.  
 
However, none of the studies above account for spatial dependence between Vietnamese 
provinces. For other countries, we have already noted Coughlin and Segev (2000), who use a 
spatial error model to analyze the determinants of FDI in 29 Chinese provinces. The authors 
conclude that an FDI shock in one province has positive effects on FDI in nearby provinces.  
With respect to Russia,  Ledyaeva (2009) finds weak evidence of competition between 
provinces for FDI and reports that that market size, the presence of big cities and sea ports, oil 
and gas resources, distance to the European market, political and legislation risks and FDI in 
neighboring regions are important determinants of FDI in Russia. In the context of the Spanish 
regions, Villarde and Maza (2011) report absence of spatial dependence in the dependent 
variable (FDI) but presence of significant effects from spatially-lagged independent variables. 
Finally, Gamboa (2013) shows complementarity between FDI in a host state and neighboring 
states in Mexico. Market size, wages and education are among other variables that explain 
variation in FDI between Mexican states. Table 1 below presents empirical findings on FDI 
with respect to spatial dependence between sub-national regions. 
Table 1 to go here 
The review above indicates that the number of FDI studies that utilize spatial analysis at the 
country, regional or provincial levels is small. Furthermore, a spatial analysis of the FDI in 
Vietnamese regions is yet to emerge. Therefore, we aim to contribute to the emerging literature 
in three areas. First, we provide a range of empirical estimates for conventional FDI 
determinants and spatial dependence, using spatial regression models with different 
specifications for weight matrices based on different numbers of neighboring provinces and 
different cut-off values for distance between provinces. In doing this, we follow LeSage and 
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Pace (2009) and Elhorst et al. (2010a) to test for the weight matrix specification that best fits 
the data. Secondly, we provide estimates of not only direct but also indirect effects of the spatial 
interdependence on FDI. The direct effect refers to the extent to which FDI in a host province 
is affected by the province-specific explanatory variables. The indirect effect, on the other hand, 
measures the extent to which a given change in explanatory variables for the host province 
affects FDI in other provinces. Third, we evaluate the sign and magnitude of the spatial 
interdependence coefficient to establish whether agglomeration or competition effects dominate 
in the distribution of FDI between Vietnamese provinces; and whether FDI capital in 
Vietnamese provinces is motivated by complex vertical integration and export platform 
motivations of the MNEs.  
 
3. FDI in Vietnamese provinces  
Liberalization of FDI policies in Vietnam dates back to the first FDI Law, which was introduced 
in 1987 and amended several times in 1992, 1996 and 2000 with a view to provide a better 
investment climate for foreign investors. These policies to promote FDI succeeded in attracting 
Japanese FDI inflows, albeit at low levels (Urata and Kawai, 2000). In a further effort to 
liberalize FDI policies, the Unified Law of Investment replacing previous laws and regulations 
was accepted in 2006. Equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors was the major 
innovation in the Unified Law, which was introduced to comply with the requirements of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. Liberalization of FDI policies coupled with 
WTO membership in 2007 boosted FDI inflows in Vietnam. 
Table 2 below presents the sectoral composition of registered FDI in 2009. According to Table 
2, manufacturing is the most attractive sector for foreign investors in Vietnam with a share of 
51.05% of registered FDI. Second to manufacturing is the real estate activities sector, receiving 
nearly a quarter of registered FDI. Compared with manufacturing and real estate activities, the 
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other sectors attract relatively less FDI. Dominance of the manufacturing sector is also felt in 
exports of Vietnam. Manufactured products generated nearly 60% of total export earnings in 
2009.1 Relatively high share of manufacturing in both FDI and export earnings imply that 
foreign investors might be motivated to locate production in Vietnam in order to ship goods 
either to country of origin or third countries from Vietnam.  
Table 2 to go here 
 
FDI inflows into Vietnamese provinces are concentrated mainly in North-Central, Central-
Coastal, South-Eastern and the Red River regions. As Table 3 indicates, ten provinces from 
these regions hold 85% of cumulative FDI in 2009. Of these ten provinces, Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC), Ba Ria–Vung Tau (BRVT), Dong Nai and Binh Duong of South-Eastern regions 
stand out with 51% share in total FDI. The top three provinces in terms of FDI inflows in Table 
3 are also the richest provinces in Vietnam according to per capita GDP figures for 2009. 
Table 3 to go here 
 
The map of Vietnam below provides an overview of cumulative FDI inflows in 2009. White 
areas indicate the provinces with ten lowest FDI inflows, while brown areas show the provinces 
with highest FDI inflows.  Provinces with low FDI inflows are located together. For instance, 
Ha Giang, Cao Bang and Bac Kan in the North and Dak Nong, Dak Lak and Gia Lai in the 
South-West are neighbors. By the same token, there is a correlation in space among provinces 
with high FDI inflows. Four provinces with highest FDI inflows in the South-East are clustered 
and they are surrounded by provinces with high FDI inflows as well.  
                                                          
1 The share of earnings of manufactured goods calculation is based on data by Exports of goods by standard 
international trade classification (SITC) provided by the General Statistics Office in Vietnam. 
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Figure 1 to go here 
Finally, the existing evidence indicates that FDI investment decisions are highly likely to be 
informed by ‘export platform’ considerations in addition to horizontal, vertical or complex 
vertical specialization considerations of the foreign investors. The share of the ‘foreign-invested 
sector’ in export earnings has been historically high - at about 30% until the end of the 1990s. 
The share has increased to 54% over the decade from 2000-2010 (General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam). This high level of export orientation requires careful examination of the spatial 
dependence between Vietnamese provinces. The latter are not ‘alternative export markets’ for 
foreign investors. Rather, they are just parts of a single jurisdiction and as such they can be 
considered only as alternative locations or platforms for MNE exports to the rest of the world. 
Given this property and the high level of export-orientation, the distribution of FDI between 
Vietnamese regions may be subject to agglomeration rather than competition effects; and the 
province-specific factors may have direct and indirect effects with similar rather than opposite 
signs.   
 
In section 4 below, we model spatial interaction between provinces using distance-weighted or 
neighboring-province-weighted matrices, with different cut-off values for distance and 
different numbers of neighboring provinces. We report estimation results for spatial interaction 
with one nearest neighbor, three nearest neighbors, 186km and 350km. The cut-off distance of 
186km ensures that a province has at least 3 nearest neighbor (with an average of 12 neighbors), 
whereas the cut-off distance of 350km ensures that a province has at least 7 nearest neighbors 
(with an average of 19 neighbors). 
 
4. Methodology and data 
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The existing literature tends to focus on a range of locational factors that affect FDI inflows at 
the national or sub-national levels. Our choice of FDI determinants is informed by the literature 
reviewed above and province-level data availability for Vietnamese provinces. Our dataset 
covers 62 out of 63 provinces from six regions of Vietnam for the period 2006-2009.2 This 
leads to a balanced panel dataset of 248 observations in total with respect to data on 62 
provinces over a four year period.  
As dependent variable, we use the natural logarithm of the per-capita registered FDI capital 
(lnFDI) in provinces, measured in Vietnamese Dong (VND). Original data for FDI were in 
current US$, which we converted to (VND) using exchange rate (market rate). Our FDI measure 
is scaled by the population of each province with a view to reduce the risk of heteroscedasticity 
related to scale (Baum 2006).  
 In line with the empirical literature on locational determinants of FDI (Segev 2000; Pham 2002; 
Malesky 2007; Cole, Elliott, and Zhang 2008; Pham 2008), we use the natural logarithm of per-
capita GDP (lnPCGDP) in each province as a measure of market potential. We expect higher 
levels of per-capita GDP to lead to higher levels of registered FDI. The natural logarithm of 
provincial domestic investment scaled by provincial population (lnDI) is used to check whether 
domestic investment function as a substitute or complement to FDI. Openness to international 
trade (lnOP) is defined as the natural logarithm of the percentage share of provincial exports 
and imports in provincial GDP.  Original values of exports and imports in current US$ were 
first converted to VND then divided by GDP. We expect openness to have a positive effect on 
provincial registered FDI capital because relatively more open provinces are more likely to 
offer the right mix of infrastructure and skills required by MNEs. Labor costs are an important 
                                                          
2
 We exclude one province (Bac Lieu) for which data is incomplete. See Appendix A1 for the list of provinces 
covered by our sample. 
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component of production costs, for which we control by using a real wage proxy.  Labor cost 
(lnLC) is the natural logarithm of compensation per employee per month; and it is expected to 
have a negative effect on registered FDI capital in each province.  
As far as human capital is concerned, we use the natural logarithm of the lower secondary 
school enrolment per 1000 inhabitants (lnLS) in each province. We expect FDI within each 
province to be related positively to lower secondary-school enrolment between the ages of 11-
15 years.  This is because lower-secondary education is a good indicator of literacy and a 
precursor of the vocational technical education that would follow. Finally, we include the 
Provincial Competitive Index (PCI) to measure the impact of governance quality on FDI.3 
Higher values of PCI indicate better governance, which we assume to have a positive impact 
on registered FDI.4  All monetary values were deflated to 2005 VND.  
Data for FDI, GDP per capita, domestic investment, exports, imports and lower school 
secondary enrolment are provided by General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). We collected 
labor cost data from the principle indicators of enterprises by regions and provinces published 
by GSO. We retrieved PCI data from its online source. Data sources and summary statistics for 
all the variables in level are provided in Table A3 and A4 in the Appendices, respectively. 
 
The empirical model is specified below, with subscripts i (1,…,62) and t (1,…,4) denoting 
province and time, respectively. 
��ܨܦ�௜� = ߚଵ��ܲܥܩܦ ௜ܲ� + ߚଶ��ܦ�௜� + ߚଷ���ܥ௜� + ߚସ��ܱ ௜ܲ� + ߚହ����௜� + ߚ଺ܲܥ�௜�+ �௜�  (1)  
                                                          
3 PCI measures the perceived quality of economic governance institutions and business environment at the 
province level and consists of nine sub-indexes: entry   costs; land access and security of tenure; transparency 
and access to information; time costs of business start-ups; proactivity or local administration; informal charges; 
quality of business support services; labor training services; and legal institutions. 
4
 For robustness check, we used enrolment in upper secondary school as a proxy for human capital and 
corruption as a proxy for governance quality. The results remain same and can be provided upon request.  
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Equation (1) overlooks the potential for spatial dependence either in the dependent variable 
(lnFDI) or through the error term (ε). To check whether spatial dependence exists, we use the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test proposed by Anselin (1988). The null hypothesis in the LM tests 
posits the absence of spatial dependence, the rejection of which indicates the existence of spatial 
dependence that may be due to ‘spatially-lagged’ dependent variable or spatially-autocorrelated 
errors.  Hence correct specification of the model in (1) must take account of both types of spatial 
dependence – as indicated in equations (2) and (3) below.  
��ܨܦ�௜� = ߙ + ߚଵ��ܲܥܩܦ ௜ܲ� + ߚଶ��ܦ�௜� + ߚଷ���ܥ௜� + ߚସ��ܱ ௜ܲ� + ߚହ����௜�+ ߚ଺ܲܥ�௜� + ����ܨܦ�௝� + �௜�  (2)  
 �௜� = ���௝� + �௜� (3)  
 −1 ≤ � ≤ 1              ���        − 1 ≤ � ≤ 1  (4)  
 
Two main differences are evident here. First, the model is augmented with a new term that 
captures the spatial dependence in the dependent variable (����ܨܦ�௝�). Here, ρ is the ‘spatial 
lag’ and W is a weight matrix based on distance between provinces.  Spatial dependence in the 
dependent variable is known as the spatial lag problem and is captured by the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient ρ. The latter measures the extent to which FDI in neighboring spatial 
units has an exogenous effect on FDI in a host unit, after controlling for the effect of other 
exogenous variables. Therefore, ignoring this type of spatial dependence is tantamount to model 
misspecification, which leads to biased estimates and invalid statistical inference.  
Secondly, the error term (�௜�), as defined in (3), consists of two terms: the idiosyncratic error 
term (�௜�) and a spatially-weighted autoregressive component (���௝�).  This specification 
captures the spatial dependence between the error terms, which is usually known as the ‘spatial 
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error’ problem. This problem arises when a shock to FDI in neighboring provinces affect the 
level of FDI in a host province through the error term. In such cases, OLS estimates are unbiased 
but the inference based on OLS estimation is invalid because the standard errors of the estimates 
do not take account of spatial autocorrelation.  
As indicated above, the LM tests allow for establishing if one or both types of spatial 
dependence exist in the data and hence whether OLS estimation should be rejected in favor of 
estimators that take account of spatial interdependence. The LM test for spatial lag tests the 
hypothesis whether ρ=0 in Equation (2) and LM test for spatial error tests if λ=0 in Equation 
(3). Note that the spatial interaction coefficients (ρ and λ) must satisfy the condition in (4) – i.e., 
they must range between -1 and 1.  
Spatial interaction is modeled as a weight matrix (W) based on distance (d) between Vietnamese 
provinces. The level of spatial dependence is modeled to diminish at a quadratic rate as distance 
increases. Hence, heavier weights are attached to nearer neighbors than distant ones. Given the 
poor transportation infrastructure and s-shape of Vietnam, it is plausible to think that interaction 
between nearer neighbors would be much stronger than distant ones. The advantage of using 
physical distance is due to its exogeneity with respect to FDI (Anselin and Bera 1998). 
Empirical studies use different specifications for distances, including the nearest neighbor, 
contiguous provinces, distance-based matrices, and distance-based matrices with a critical cut-
off value. In the absence of clear guidance for the choice of cut-off distance, empirical studies 
make use of the log-likelihood and R-squared values to compare estimation results based on 
different weight matrices (Abreu, de Groot, and Florax 2004; Seldadyo, Elhorst, and de Haan 
2010). In this study, we use four different specifications for the distance-based weight matrix: 
the nearest neighbor (W1); the nearest three neighbors (W3), all neighbors within a radius of 
186 km from the capital of the host province (W186) which ensures that we have at least 3 
neighbors for the host province; all neighbors within a radius of 350 km from the capital of the 
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host province (W350), which ensures that we have at least 7 neighbors for the host province. 
We take capital cities of provinces as reference points in calculating distance between 
provinces. As provinces get larger, distances to neighbors increase. In addition, provinces in 
the middle of the country such as Quang Binh and Ha Tinh are more distant from their neighbors 
than provinces in the north and south are. At this point, choice of a cut-off distance value 
becomes critical. Because a small cut-off value considerably reduces the number of neighbors 
with which large provinces and provinces located in the middle of the country interact. Bearing 
this in mind, we choose a cut-of value of 186 km in order to allow each province to interact at 
least with three neighbors. By the same token, we increase cut-off value from 186km to 350km 
to allow each province to interact at least with 7 neighbors. We use these different specifications 
in order to verify if spatial dependence vary with distance and whether there is a critical distance 
beyond which indirect and feedback effects due to spatial dependence cease to be important.  
Quite often, the spatial lag model is preferred to the spatial error model. This is because the 
former allows for obtaining a rich set of estimates for the effects of a given explanatory variable 
- including direct, indirect and feedback effects. In addition, the spatial lag model also allows 
for establishing whether spatial dependence is reflected as agglomeration or competition effects 
in the distribution of FDI between spatial units (Blonigen et al. 2007). However, the choice 
between the two must be based on the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Anselin 1988) – as 
indicated above.  
If the test indicates estimation with spatial lag, LeSage and Pace (2009) propose a calculation 
method that decomposes the total effect into direct and indirect effects. The direct effect refers 
to change in the province-specific FDI capital in province i caused by a one-unit change in the 
explanatory variable(s) for that province. The indirect effect, which is also known as spatial 
spill-over effect, measures the change in province-specific FDI capital in province j (where j ≠ 
i) caused by unit change in the explanatory variables of province i. Finally, the feedback effect 
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is calculated as the difference between the direct effect and the point estimate (Seldadyo, 
Elhorst, and de Haan 2010); where the point estimate is the estimate of β in model (2). 
  
5. Empirical results  
Table 4 below presents our findings on the determinants of registered FDI capital in Vietnamese 
provinces from 2006 -2009. Panel (1) reports the OLS estimation results without spatially-
lagged dependent variable. Panel (2) presents the results of the maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimations, which include the spatially-lagged dependent variable (WlnFDI) as explanatory 
variable. The ML estimation results and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests in Panel (2) are 
based on different specifications for neighboring provinces. The specifications for weight 
matrix include one nearest neighbor (W1), three nearest neighbors (W3), a distance cut-off 
value of 186km (W186) that ensures the weight matrix includes at least three neighbors; and a 
distance cut-off value of 350km (W350).5 
At the bottom of Table 4, we report the results of the LM tests for spatial dependence and for 
deciding whether the latter should be modeled as spatial error or spatial lag. In all specifications 
of the distance-based weight matrix, the LM tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of no 
spatial dependence in the error term. In contrast, the LM tests for absence of spatial dependence 
in the dependent variable are rejected under three specifications of the weight matrix: W1, W3 
and W186. The null hypothesis of no spatial lag cannot be rejected when the weight matrix is 
based on a distance cut off of 350 km. In such cases, Anselin et al. (1996) proposes a robust 
LM test to establish whether spatial lag estimation is still preferable to OLS estimation when 
the LM test is inconclusive. The robust LM test rejects the hypothesis of no spatial lag when 
                                                          
5
 We have also used two other matrices based on two nearest neighbors and distance cut off at 500km. The 
results remain unchanged and can be supplied upon request. 
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the weight matrix is specified at a distance cut-off of 350 km too. Hence, all results reported in 
Panel (2) of Table 4 are based on ML estimation of the spatial lag model specified in equation 
(2) above.  
 
Table 4 to go here 
 
The coefficient of the spatial lag (i.e., the coefficient of WlnFDI) is positive and significant 
under all specifications of the weight matrix. In fact, the level of spatial dependence tends to 
increase from 0.116 to 0.183 as the distance between province i and its neighbors or the number 
of neighboring provinces increases. Technically, this finding indicates that the OLS estimates 
in panel 1 would be biased due to omission of the spatial lag term from the model. The positive 
coefficient also confirms the positive spatial autocorrelation in lnFDI results obtained from the 
Moran s I test, which are reported in Table A2 of the Appendix for each year and each weight 
matrix specification.6  
 
More importantly, however, our findings point out the existence of an agglomeration dynamic 
in the distribution of FDI capital across Vietnamese provinces. The presence of FDI activities 
in neighboring provinces appears to have a positive effect on FDI in a given province and this 
effect is in addition to the partial effects of the locational factors specific to the province itself. 
In fact, this spatial dependence explains why cumulative FDI is clustered in the North, the 
Middle and South of the country, with each cluster being centered around a core of provinces 
with the highest levels of FDI concentration (see map in Figure 1 above).  The spatial 
                                                          
6
 Moran’s I statistic tests whether provinces, which are located closer together are more likely to have similar 
registered FDI levels than those which are further apart. The null hypothesis for this tests states that there is zero 
spatial autocorrelation in the variable lnFDI. 
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dependence and the agglomeration effects it depicts are partly due to geographical 
characteristics such as natural ports. Indeed, the provinces with the highest levels of 
concentration are located near major ports, which include Cam Pha. Quang Ninh and Vat Cach 
in the North; Da Nang in the Middle and Saigon, Nha Trang and Sa Dec in the South.  
 
The spatial lag estimation allows not only for detecting the existence or absence of 
agglomeration effects as indicated above but also for establishing the extent to which spatial 
dependence is reinforced through the locational characteristics of each province. In other words, 
it allows for opening up the ‘black box’ through which the agglomeration effects are unfolding. 
The agglomeration effects may be driven by physical geography factors such as ports or 
infrastructure facilities such as airports or highways. However, they may also be due to 
economic/demographic factors that foreign investors also take into account.  
The results in Table 4 enable us to establish the extent to which spatial dependence is reinforced 
or ameliorated through economic/demographic factors. This can be established by examining 
the indirect-effect estimates reported in Table 4.7 Our results indicate that the province-specific 
per-capita GDP, domestic investment, openness to trade and lower-secondary enrolment ratio 
all have positive indirect effects on FDI capital in neighboring provinces. Province-specific 
labor costs, on the other hand, have negative effects. The indirect effects have the same sign as 
direct effects. Furthermore, they are significant when the weight matrix is based on the nearest 
one neighbor or nearest 3 neighbors; but they become insignificant as the distance increases. 
Hence, we can conclude that the province-specific economic/demographic factors affect the 
level of FDI in the province itself and its immediate neighbors in the same direction.  
                                                          
7 The estimation of direct and indirect effect is based on procedures proposed by LeSage and Pace (2009). 
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This finding indicates that stronger market potential, openness to trade or higher levels of 
secondary education in one province attract FDI not only into the province itself but also into 
its neighboring provinces. This is because FDI decisions are likely to have been influenced not 
only by the economic/demographic potential of a given province itself but also by that of its 
immediate neighbors – which can serve either as markets for finished products/services or as 
additional source of labor or skills. Such market complementarities or externalities are more 
likely to be the case when the unit of analysis is a sub-national province (as it is the case here) 
rather than a different jurisdiction because the mobility of goods and services between sub-
national units is usually higher than the level of mobility between different jurisdictions.  
Our findings also enable us to derive some conclusions about MNE motivations for FDI in 
Vietnam. As indicated in sections 2 and 3 above, MNE engagement in FDI may be due to 
complex vertical integration and/or export platform motives. According to the typology 
identified by Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007), FDI is driven 
by complex vertical integration motives when the sign of the spatial lag is positive and 
significant. Also, FDI is driven by export platform motives when the sign of the indirect effects 
is positive and significant. Our findings indicate that FDI in Vietnam is driven by complex 
vertical integration and export platform motives. In both cases, the existence of FDI activity in 
one province/region is not at the expense of neighboring regions/provinces because foreign 
investors aim to supply not only the local but also the international market. This is compatible 
with the descriptive evidence on the composition of Vietnamese exports – which indicates more 
than 50% of Vietnam’s total export earnings have been generated by the foreign-invested 
sectors since 2000.  
Furthermore, our findings enable us to compare and contrast different types of estimates within 
a unified framework. For example, when compared to ML estimates, OLS estimates tend to 
over-estimate the effects of provincial per-capita GDP (lnPCGDP), openness to trade (lnOP) 
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and lower-secondary school pupils (lnLS); but they underestimate the effects of domestic 
investment (lnDI) and labor cost (lnLC). The over- or under-estimation is due to model 
misspecification bias caused by absence of spatial lag variable in the OLS specification. 
Although point estimates obtained from the ML estimation are reliable for inference, they may 
also under- or over-estimate the true effect of each explanatory variable. As noted by Elhorst 
(2010a), the true marginal effects (i.e., the partial derivatives of model 2) are the direct-effect 
estimates.8  Hence, inference about the effects of locational factors should be based on direct-
effect rather than point estimates; and the difference between the point and direct-effect 
estimates is equal to the feedback effect (Seldadyo, Elhorst, and de Haan 2010). The latter 
occurs as a result of second- and higher-order spill-over effects from neighboring provinces 
following the initial change in the province-specific determinant of FDI.  
Having summarized the range of estimates that can be obtained from spatial regression analysis, 
we can now summarize the findings related to true marginal effects – i.e., to direct-effect and 
indirect-effect estimates. The direct-effect estimates indicate that higher levels of province-
specific per-capita GDP (lnPCGDP), per-capita domestic investment (lnDI), trade openness 
(lnOP), perceived governance quality (PCI) and lower-secondary enrolment (lnLS) lead to 
higher levels of registered FDI capital (lnFDI). The estimate is negative only in the case of 
labor costs. These findings are in line with OLS estimates reported by Na and Lightfoot (2006) 
and Cole, Elliott, and Zhang (2009) with respect to FDI across Chinese regions; and with those 
reported by Pham (2002, 2008) and Nguyen (2006), Vu, Le, and Vo (2007), and Malesky (2007) 
with respect to Vietnamese provinces.  
                                                          
8 For calculating direct and indirect effect estimates, we used the ‘panel_effects_sar’  function in Matlab, which is 
developed by Le Sage and Pace and adapted for  the spatial panel models by Elhorst. See, 
http://www.regroningen.nl/elhorst/software/panel_effects_sar.m. 
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With respect to market size, our findings are similar to those of Ledyeva (2009), Coughlin and 
Segev (2000) and Gamboa (2013), who investigate determinants of FDI in Russian regions, 
Chinese provinces and Mexican states, respectively. In addition, labour cost is reported to have 
a negative effect on FDI in Chinese provinces and Mexican states, as we have found in the case 
of Vietnamese provinces. As for the nature of spatial dependence, we find a positive spatial 
dependence in FDI between provinces in Vietnam in contrast to Russian regions. The 
magnitude of positive spatial dependence we present here is smaller than the one for Mexican 
states reported by Gamboa (2013). These findings suggest that the nature and strength of spatial 
dependence in FDI, if exists, may vary across countries at subnational regions, reflecting 
different motives for FDI and degrees of spatial dependence between geographic units.   
Nevertheless, our findings enhance the evidence in three directions. First, we demonstrate that 
estimates reported by the existing literature may have the correct sign but they may also be 
subject to model misspecification bias, which is due to exclusion of spatial dependence from 
estimated models. Secondly, we demonstrate that unit-specific locational factors have both 
direct effects on FDI within the province itself and indirect effects on FDI in neighboring 
provinces. The indirect effects are smaller in magnitude but have the same sign as the direct 
effects.   
The third contribution relates to uncovering an agglomeration dynamic in the distribution of 
FDI across Vietnamese provinces. Our findings indicate that the agglomeration effects unfold 
through spatial dependence between provinces and via indirect effects of the locational 
economic and demographic factors. Given that the direct and indirect effects have the same 
sign, agglomeration effects through both channels reinforce each other within provincial 
clusters that consist of two or four provinces - i.e., when the weight matrix is based on one 
nearest and three nearest neighbors. When the number of neighboring regions exceeds four, the 
agglomeration effect captured by the spatial dependence continues to exist, but it is not 
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reinforced by market complementarities captured by the indirect effects of locational 
characteristics such as market size, openness to trade, education, wages and economic 
governance quality. 
6. Conclusions 
In this article, we have investigated the locational factors that affect FDI inflows into sub-
national units in Vietnam, taking into account both economic/institutional factors and the 
interactions of the latter with geography. Using a dataset on registered FDI capital in 62 
Vietnamese provinces from 2006-2009 and drawing on recent developments in spatial 
regression methodology, we have discovered a number of empirical patterns that enhance the 
existing evidence base and may inform policy and practice.  
First, we have demonstrated that OLS estimates for the effects of locational determinants of 
FDI inflows would be biased if the latter are subject to spatial dependence, measured as 
geographical proximity of the host provinces. The bias is equal to the difference between the 
point estimates from OLS estimation and the direct-effect estimates from the maximum 
likelihood estimation with spatial dependence. The difference is about 10% and reflects either 
an upward bias (as it is the case for the effects of per-capita GDP and education on FDI flows) 
or a downward bias as it is the case for the effect of domestic investment on FDI flows. The 
implication for future research is that it is necessary to test for the presence of spatial 
dependence in FDI flows and the case for such tests is stronger when geographical units 
correspond to provinces or regions within the same country.  
Second, the signs and significance of the bias-corrected direct-effect estimates we have found 
are in line with existing findings with or without control for spatial dependence. Hence, we 
have confidence in the inference quality of our findings that take account of spatial dependence. 
Our bias-corrected findings indicate that province-level per-capita GDP, domestic investment, 
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openness to trade, governance quality and education have positive effects on FDI inflows into 
provinces; whereas labor costs have a negative effect. These bias-corrected estimates remain 
robust to different specifications of geographical proximity, ranging from three neighbors to 
350 km that envelope at least 7 neighboring provinces.  
Third, we have added to the existing evidence base by comparing the direct- and indirect-effect 
estimates for the locational factors that affect FDI inflows. We have found that the direct- and 
indirect-effect estimates for each locational factor have the same sign, but the indirect-effect 
estimates are always smaller than (about 12% - 20% of) the direct-effect estimates. Given that 
the signs of the direct- and indirect-effect estimates are the same, our findings indicate that 
province-specific factors have spill-over effects on FDI in neighboring provinces. Stated 
differently, neighboring provinces are able to attract higher levels of FDI when the levels of 
per-capita GDP, domestic investment, openness to trade, secondary-school enrollment and 
governance quality in one of the provinces increases. However, the spill-over effect disappears 
as the distance between the province and its neighbors increases.  
Fourth, we have also added to the existing evidence base by estimating the level of spatial 
dependence in the distribution of registered FDI capital across Vietnamese provinces. The 
effect of spatial dependence is positive and remains robust to change in the specification of the 
weight matrix from one nearest neighbor and 3 nearest neighbors to distance cut-off values of 
186km and 350km. This finding indicates that the distribution of registered FDI between 
Vietnamese provinces is subject to agglomeration dynamics. Indeed, a 10% increase in 
distance-weighted value of the FDI in neighboring provinces tends to increase the FDI in a 
province by 1.2% - 1.8%. This agglomeration effect explains the concentration of FDI within 
three clusters in the North, the Middle and South of the Country.  
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However, we have also established that the spatial-dependence effect tends to increase as the 
distance between a given province and its neighbors increases. Indeed, the spatial lag coefficient 
increases from 0.116 for one nearest neighbors to 0.183 when the distance is set at 350kms 
between one province and its furthest neighbor. This finding indicates that the agglomeration 
effect is not limited to the nearest neighbors of an FDI-intensive province. If anything, the 
agglomeration effect is spread over a larger geographical space; and neighbors at the periphery 
are more likely to benefit from FDI inflows into an FDI-intensive province. 
Three policy implications follow from our findings. First, FDI inflows into Vietnamese 
provinces are highly sensitive to labor costs. Nevertheless, we do not recommend wage 
moderation as a province-level policy aimed at attracting FDI. As indicated in section 3 above, 
provincial clusters with the highest levels of FDI are those with the highest levels of per-capita 
GDP too. Hence, provinces within such clusters would be better-placed to afford wage 
moderation compared to provinces within clusters of low per-capita GDP and FDI 
concentration levels. Therefore, wage moderation as a means of attracting FDI is likely to have 
the adverse consequence of perpetuating inter-province disparity in terms of both FDI 
concentration and per-capita GDP levels.  
The second policy implication that follows from our findings relates to the role of education. 
We found that the rate of secondary school enrolment has the largest direct-effect on FDI 
inflows. Approximately, a 1% increase in the rate of secondary education enrolment is 
associated with 2% increase in registered FDI. In addition, our findings indicate secondary 
school enrolment has high levels of spill-over effects on FDI in neighboring provinces and the 
existing literature indicates that the personal returns on education are positive in Vietnam (see, 
for example, Gallup, 2002; Liu, 2006 and Pham and Reilly, 2007). Therefore, there is evidential 
case for increasing investment in education as a means of both attracting FDI into provinces 
and reducing income disparities between provinces.  
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The third policy implications of our findings relate to governance quality, as measured by the 
provincial competitiveness index (PCI). As indicated above, PCI measures the province-level 
perceptions of the quality of economic governance institutions and business environment. It 
consists of nine sub-indexes: entry costs; land access and security of tenure; transparency and 
access to information; time costs of business start-ups; proactivity or local administration; 
informal charges; quality of business support services; labor training services; and legal 
institutions. Our findings indicate that the direct effect of PCI is positive but small (usually, 
around 0.03). In addition, the PCI in one province has no spill-over effects on FDI inflows into 
neighboring provinces. This finding indicates that inter-province competition based on PCI is 
the least effective strategy compared to other policy options that involve increasing education 
levels, domestic investment or openness to trade.  
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Appendices 
A1: List of Provinces in the Sample 
REGIONS PROVINCES 
Central Highlands Dak Lak, Lam Dong, Dak Nong, Gia Lai, Kon Tum 
 
 
Mekong River Delta 
 
An Giang, Hau Giang, Thai Binh, Vinh Long, Soc Trang, 
Ca Mau, Long An, Can Tho, Kien Giang, Tra Vinh, Ben 
Tre, Dong Thap, Tien Giang 
 
 
North Central and Central Coastal area 
 
TT-Hue, Khanh Hoa, Quang Binh, Quang Nam, Nghe 
An, Ninh Thuan, Da Nang, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Quang 
Ngai, Ha Tinh, Quang Tri, Thanh Hoa, Binh Thuan 
 
 
Northern midlands and mountain areas 
Lai Chau,  Thai Nguyen,  Dien Bien,  Lang Son,  Cao 
Bang,  Bac Kan,  Ha Giang,  Lao Cai,  Yen Bai,  Son La,  
Hoa Binh,  Tuyen Quang,  Phu Tho,  Bac Giang  
Red River 
 
Hung Yen,  Quang Ninh,  Ha Nam,  Nam Dinh,  Hai 
Duong,  Ninh Binh,  Hai Phong,  Bac Ninh,  Ha Noi,  
Vinh Phuc  
South East 
 
Dong Nai,  Binh Duong,  Binh Phuoc,  BRVT,  Tay Ninh,  
HCMC  
 
A2: Moran s I Test for Spatial Autocorrelation lnFDI  
Moran s I test W1 W3 W186 W350 
lnFDI 2006   0.426 
     (0.00) 
0.290 
(0.00) 
0.181 
(0.00) 
0.141 
(0.00) 
lnFDI 2007 0.449 (0.00) 
0.317 
(0.00) 
0.203 
(0.00) 
0.161 
(0.00) 
lnFDI 2008 0.419 (0.02) 
0.312 
(0.00) 
0.204 
(0.00) 
0.163 
(0.00) 
lnFDI 2009 0.438 (0.00) 
0.325 
(0.00) 
0.221 
(0.00) 
0.178 
(0.00) 
Notes: Two-sided and under normality. P-values are in parenthesis.  
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A3: Data sources 
Data Unit of 
Measurement 
Source 
Foreign direct 
investment  
US$  Provided by General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
(GSO) 
Exchange rate 
(Market rate) 
US Dollars per 
Vietnamese Dong 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics Annual Series 
Population People Provided by GSO 
GDP Vietnamese Dong Provided by GSO 
Labor cost  Vietnamese Dong Principle indicators of enterprises 
by regions and provinces, GSO 
Domestic 
investment  
Vietnamese Dong  Provided by GSO 
Exports and 
Imports 
US$ Provided by GSO 
Provincial 
Competitivene
ss Index 
Index http://www.pcivietnam.org/index.php?lang=en 
Lower-
secondary 
school 
enrolment  
Number of pupils Provided by GSO 
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A4: Summary statistics  
Variable Description  Observation Mean Std. Dev.          Min          Max 
FDI 
Foreign direct 
investment 
/population in 
2005 Vietnamese 
Dong (VND) 
    248 19464991 39326062 2302 292598592 
PCGDP 
Gross domestic 
investment 
/population in 
2005 VND 
248 11176855 13709054 3274478 124828848 
LC 
Labour cost per 
employee per 
month in 2005 
VND 
     248 1546279 486483.8 749538.6 3801693 
DI 
Domestic 
investment 
/population in 
2005 VND 
248 4318213 2638279 566728 20591074 
OP 
Openness: 
Exports plus 
imports/GDP 
248 69.594 106.3745 0.933 749.690 
PCI 
Quality of 
economic 
governance 
institutions and 
business 
environment 
248 55.388 7.862 36.390 77.2 
LS 
Number of pupils 
in lower 
secondary 
school/population 
in 1000s 
 248 69.598 13.241 34.135 105.387 
W*FDI 
Spatially-lagged 
FDI 
   248 25243789 44287970 2302 292598048 
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Tables  
Table 1 Summary of empirical findings on FDI with respect to spatial dependence 
between sub-national regions 
 
Studies Sub-national 
regions 
Sign of 
spatial lag 
Motive 
for FDI 
Ledyaeva(2009) Russian 
regions (-) Vertical 
Villaverde and 
Maza (2012) 
Spanish 
regions 
 
(insignificant) 
Export 
platform 
Gamboa (2013) Mexican 
states (+) 
Complex 
vertical  
 
Table 2 Sectoral composition of registered FDI in 2009 
Sectors 
Sector share in total registered 
FDI (%)  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.75 
Mining and quarrying 1.68 
Manufacturing 51.05 
Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply 1.10 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 0.03 
Construction 5.59 
Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 0.68 
Transportation and storage 1.32 
Accommodation and food service activities 6.34 
Information and communication 2.70 
Financial, banking and insurance activities 0.72 
Real estate activities 23.59 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.36 
Administrative and support service activities 0.10 
Education and training 0.15 
Human health and social work activities 0.51 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.96 
Other activities 0.36 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam 
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Table 3 Top-ten Vietnamese provinces with registered FDI in 2009 (millions of US$)  
Region Province Registered   FDI 
Share in 
Total  FDI 
South East HCMC 30981.6 18% 
South East BRVT 25700.2 15% 
Red River Ha Noi 22306.9 13% 
South East Dong Nai 17838.1 10% 
South East Binh Duong 13924.6 8% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Ninh Thuan 10055.9 6% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Ha Tinh 8068.5 5% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Phu Yen 8060.8 5% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Thanh Hoa 7040.3 4% 
North Central and Central Coastal  Quang Nam 5190.5 3% 
Total        149167      85% 
Source: Own calculation based on data from the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam 
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Table 4 Determinants of FDI with different weight matrices for spatial dependence 
    Panel (1) Panel (2) 
   OLS 
    
ML estimation with weight matrices 
(W1) (W3) (W186) (W350) 
Constant 
t value 
 
-17.637*** 
(-2.58) 
-15.982** 
(-2.42) 
-14.161** 
(-2.13) 
-17.081** 
(-2.54) 
-17.323** 
(-2.56) 
lnPCGDP 
Point estimate 
t value 
Direct effect in province i 
Indirect effect in provinces j ≠i 
 
1.364 *** 
(3.95) 
 
 
1.141*** 
(3.40) 
1.134*** 
0.156** 
 
1.178*** 
(2.99) 
1.195*** 
  0.253** 
 
1.233*** 
(3.62) 
1.230*** 
0.233 
 
1.265*** 
(3.71) 
1.269*** 
0.294 
lnDI 
Point estimate 
t value 
Direct effect in province i 
Indirect effect in provinces j ≠i 
 
1.122*** 
(4.79) 
 
 
1.244*** 
(5.48) 
1.260*** 
0.177** 
 
1.114*** 
(4.91) 
1.121*** 
0.242** 
 
1.160*** 
(5.05) 
1.158*** 
0.227 
 
1.140*** 
(4.97) 
1.139*** 
0.274 
lnLC 
Point estimate 
t value 
Direct effect in province i 
Indirect effect in provinces j ≠i 
 
-1.359*** 
(-2.73) 
 
 
-1.413*** 
(-2.95) 
-1.428*** 
-0.200* 
 
-1.462*** 
(-3.03) 
-1.482*** 
-0.319* 
 
-1.367*** 
(-2.81) 
-1.347*** 
-0.260 
 
-1.393*** 
(-2.86) 
-1.406*** 
-0.330 
lnOP 
Point estimate 
t value 
Direct effect in province i 
Indirect effect in provinces j ≠i 
 
0.599*** 
(5.21) 
 
 
0.554*** 
(4.93) 
0.554*** 
0.076** 
 
0.559*** 
(4.97) 
0.562*** 
0.119** 
 
0.561*** 
(4.92) 
0.560*** 
0.107 
 
 
0.561*** 
(4.92) 
0.564*** 
0.131 
PCI 
Point estimate 
t value 
Direct effect in province i 
Indirect effect in provinces j ≠i 
 
0.034** 
(2.20) 
 
 
0.031** 
(2.09) 
0.031** 
0.004 
 
0.029** 
(1.92) 
0.029** 
0.006 
 
0.031** 
(2.05) 
0.033** 
0.039 
 
0.031** 
(2.06) 
0.032** 
0.007 
lnLS 
Point estimate 
t value 
Direct effect in province i 
Indirect effect in provinces j ≠i 
 
2.157*** 
(3.51) 
 
 
2.002*** 
(3.50) 
1.991*** 
0.276** 
 
1.866*** 
(3.24) 
1.871*** 
0.400* 
 
1.914*** 
(3.301) 
1.927*** 
0.372 
 
1.917*** 
(3.30) 
1.897*** 
0.445 
W*lnFDI (Spatial dependence) 
t value 
 0.116*** 
(2.60) 
0.179*** 
(2.70) 
0.158* 
(1.90) 
0.183* 
(1.86) 
Observations 248 248 248 248 248 
LM  No Spatial Lag  8.19*** 5.35** 2.85* 2.30 
Robust LM  No spatial Lag  21.72*** 14.10*** 15.89***  15.59*** 
LM  No Spatial Error  0.01  0.09   0.35 0.37 
R2 0.456 0.480 0.475 0.465 0.465 
Log Likelihood  -465.536 -461.601 -462.500 -463.988 -464.153 
Note: t values are in parenthesis. ***, **,* denotes 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 significance level respectively.
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Figures 
Figure 1  Provincial distribution of cumulative FDI in Vietnam in 2009 (million 
of US$)  
 
 
 
Ha Noi and Ha Tay merged in 2007. Therefore, the cumulative FDI for Ha Noi in 2009 is equally 
allocated to both provinces in this figure. 
 
